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Unfit to Be Seen: Customer Preferences and the
Americans with Disabilities Act
ABSTRACT

Disability discrimination is a persistent and pervasive problem. Its
history in the United States stretches from the "ugly laws" of the late1800s to modern-day employment discrimination. In general, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees and job applicants. Employers
often disregard this law, however, in order to cater to the untoward
preferences of their customers. In theory, customer preferences are not
a defense to discrimination, unless they pertain to safety, privacy, or
authenticity. In practice, however, many courts seem to recognize an
unseemly fourth exception to the general rule against customer preference-based defenses. This occurs when disabled persons are deemed
"unfit to be seen."
This Note first chronicles the history of the ADA and the economic and psychological realities of customer preference-based defenses. It then describes instances in which the "unfit to be seen" strain
of the defense has been recognized by courts and analyzes its legitimacy. This Note concludes that the defense is contrary to the text of
the ADA, the intentions of the legislature, and the ADA's underlying
policies. As such, Congress and the judiciary should act to repudiate it.
In the alternative, this Note proposes standards that courts should consider in evaluating customer preference-based defenses to disability
discrimination.
fK=fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
Persons with disabilities have long been discriminated against by
society in general and by employers specifically.1 In 1990, Congress
1. This Note uses the terms "persons with disabilities," "disabled persons," "disabled
individuals," and "disabled people" interchangeably. Terms that omit the humanity of disabled
persons such as "the disabled" are disfavored, as are many terms used in former statutes and
caselaw, such as "handicapped" or "crippled." See, e.g., Disability Language Style Guide,
NATIONAL CENTER ON DISABILITY AND JOURNALISM, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (2018),
https://ncdj.org/style-guide/ (describing these conventions).
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enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to help correct this
historical injustice.2 Congress reaffirmed its opposition to disability
discrimination again in 2008 by enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA),3 which abrogated several limiting
Supreme Court decisions. Despite the plain language of the ADA's
text, the act's legislative history, and its underlying policies, some
courts have undermined the statute by allowing employer defenses4
based on untoward customer preferences.5 The customer preference
defense asserts that, because businesses could lose customers by employing disabled persons, employers may have legitimate reasons for
discriminating against disabled employees and job applicants. While
customer preference-based defenses that pertain to safety, privacy, and
authenticity have been recognized in other contexts, courts applying
the ADA have also allowed defenses based merely on customer aversion to disabled persons. This Note calls upon Congress and the courts
to disallow this practice; in addition, it proposes heightened standards
to be met in the case of permissible customer preference-based defenses.
Part I.A describes the history of disability discrimination in the
United States and the historical context of the ADA and ADAAA. Part
I.B addresses the psychology, economics, and reality of untoward customer preferences. Part I.C then describes the judiciary's history of
intolerance for customer preference-based defenses under other anti-

2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). The ADA has four titles. The first covers employment. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2018). The second covers public services. Id. §§ 12131–12165. The
third covers public accommodations and private services. Id. §§ 12181–12189. The fourth covers
miscellaneous provisions. Id. §§ 12201–12213. Congressional findings, the act's purpose statement, and definitions are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103.
3. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
4. These defenses usually take the form of bona fide occupational qualifications
(BFOQs), as first contemplated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allow employers to escape
liability for discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018). This Note focuses on this type of
defense, and thus disparate treatment cases rather than disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[t]he
primary affirmative defense provided by Title VII in a disparate treatment case is the BFOQ").
5. This Note focuses on customer preferences, but the untoward preferences of disabled
employees' coworkers, supervisors, vendors, etc. may also motivate employers to take discriminatory employment actions. Employers' incentives to cater to the preferences of these third parties are unlikely to be as strong as incentives to cater to customer preferences, however. See generally Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV.
1169 (2017).
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discrimination statutes, as well as the exceptions for preferences concerning safety, privacy, and authenticity. Part I.C identifies numerous
instances in which courts have allowed employers to discriminate
against disabled employees because their disabilities have allegedly
rendered them "unfit" to interact with or be seen by customers.6
Part II.A shows that this "unfit to be seen" exception is contrary to
the text of the ADA and argues that sublimating untoward customer
preferences is a reasonable accommodation. Part II.B confirms this
reading of the ADA by looking to the legislative history of the act. Part
II.C identifies the two major policies behind the ADA—limiting the
costs of compliance and ensuring fair treatment for disabled employees—and argues that disallowing the "unfit to be seen" exception fulfills both. Part II.D proposes additional guidelines courts may use to
ensure compliance with the ADA's text and purpose. This Note concludes by calling upon Congress and the courts to implement such
standards and to repudiate the "unfit to be seen" strain of the customer
preference defense.

ffK=`ìëíçãÉê=mêÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë=~åÇ=aáë~Äáäáíó=aáëÅêáãáå~íáçå=
Disability discrimination has historically been, and still is, a vexing
social problem. Though Congress enacted the ADA to curb this type
of discrimination, the psychology of untoward customer preferences
and the economic incentives businesses have to heed their customers
mean that employers frequently attempt to subvert antidiscrimination
laws. Though courts have traditionally been intolerant of customer
preference-based defenses within the context of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), they have displayed more
deference to the animus of employers' customers within the context of
the ADA.

A. Historical Background
In the United States, discrimination against disabled persons has a
long history, both in employment and in other contexts.7 In 1990,

6.

The documentation of this trend is likely the most significant contribution of this

7.

See infra Part I.A.1.

Note.
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Congress enacted the ADA in an attempt to combat this history of discrimination, but the act was quickly defanged in the courts.8 In 2008,
Congress enacted the ADAAA, which reaffirmed the legislature's commitment to combatting disability discrimination.9 Nonetheless, discrimination against disabled persons remains a problem today.

1. History of disability discrimination
The United States has historically treated persons with disabilities
shamefully. Americans' attitudes towards disabled persons have traditionally been characterized by fear, paternalism, ignorance, and low
expectations. Lamentably, these attitudes remain largely intact today.
Though society's attitudes toward disability have changed over
time, the one constant has been negativity.10 Throughout most of the
United States' history, disabled persons were kept out of sight and out
of mind.11 During the mid- and late-1800s, many states and localities
codified this norm, passing "ugly laws" that made it illegal for "[a]ny
person, who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so
as to be an unsightly or disgusting object . . . [to] expose himself or
herself to public view."12 These laws reflected public perception, as disabled persons were often described with such dehumanizing terms as
"vermin," "roadblock[s]," "affront to the public eye," "horrible," "hideous," "monstrosities," "half-human," and "repulsive."13
Attitudes toward persons with disabilities did not shift much during the early-1900s, and some states even passed laws which prescribed
forced sterilization for the "treatment" of disabled persons.14 While
See infra Part I.A.2.
See id. See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the substantive provisions of the ADA.
See, e.g., Adrienne Phelps Coco, Diseased, Maimed, Mutilated: Categorizations of
Disability and an Ugly Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 44 GEO. MASON J. SOC. HIST.
23, 23–24 (2010) (documenting negative attitudes towards disabled persons); see also David M.
Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction
of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 183 (1991) (citing changes in attitudes regarding foot binding
8.
9.
10.

to argue that disability is a construct).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018) ("historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities"); Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND (1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019, 5:51 PM); UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA, Disability History Timeline, http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/tbacig/studproj/is3099/pplfrst/Untitled1.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2019, 5:46 PM).
12. See, e.g., Coco, supra note 10, at 23 (quoting Chicago's ugly law).
13. Id. at 31–32 (quoting various newspapers).
14. See, e.g., Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Eugenics Victims, But Many Won't
Qualify, NPR (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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this practice was challenged in court, the Supreme Court endorsed it.
The words of Justice Holmes encapsulated beliefs held by many Americans that disabled persons were incompetent, unfit, likely to starve
without assistance, predisposed to commit murder, and that it would
be "better for all the world" to prevent them from "continuing their
kind."15 Justice Holmes's opinion is as remarkable for its brevity16 as it
is for its callous attitude and prejudice.17
Today, society still characterizes persons with disabilities negatively, frequently due to misconceptions, ignorance, and the continuing effects of past prejudice.18 Virtually every aspect of disabled persons' tastes, interests, and personalities are attributed to disability, and
impairment eclipses sex, race, age, occupation, and family in shaping
how others think of persons with disabilities.19 Disabled individuals are
seen as helpless, fueling beliefs that they are unable to perform even
minimal essential job functions.20 Society tends to focus on disabled
persons' deficits and on what they cannot do instead of what they can
do.21 And disabled individuals are still frequently shunned, ostracized,
and institutionalized.22

2. Historical context of the ADA and the ADAAA
The legislative response to the United States' history of disability
discrimination was slow to develop. During the early 1900s, advocacy
groups for persons with disabilities first began to form, though little
substantive progress was made.23 During the 1950s and 1960s, reform-

shots/2014/10/31/360355784/payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-qualify
(describing North Carolina's forced sterilization law and modern developments pertaining to it).
15. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
16. The opinion spans only nine pages. See id. at 200.
17. See id. at 207 ("[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough").
18. See, e.g., Hanoch Livneh, On the Origins of Negative Attitudes Toward People with
Disabilities, 43 REHABILITATION LITERATURE 338 (1982).
19. David Wasserman et al., Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 1 (May 23, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability/.
20. Id.
21. Engel, supra note 10, at 181–82.
22. See, e.g., Kiela Parks, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Colorado Continues to Warehouse
Mentally Ill Prisoners in Solitary, ACLU (Aug. 6, 2013, 11:31 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
prisoners-rights/cruel-inhuman-and-degrading-conditions/out-sight-out-mind-colorado-continues.
23. Perri Meldon, Disability History: The Disability Rights Movement, U.S. NATIONAL
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ers were successful in advancing civil rights for women and racial minorities, which helped pave the way for disability rights advocates.24 In
1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by recipients of federal funds.25
This legislation was particularly significant because it marked the first
time individuals with disabilities were viewed as a discrete class rather
than as dissimilar individuals suffering from various illnesses and impairments.26 In 1975, Congress also passed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, which required public schools receiving
federal funding to provide equal educational access for children with
disabilities.27
Two major protests also played important roles in the passage of
the ADA. In 1977, disabled individuals across the country participated
in a sit-in at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) in order to ensure that the department promulgated adequate
regulations for the Rehabilitation Act.28 Besides ensuring that HEW's
regulations gave force to the act, the sit-in helped shape disability discrimination as a civil rights issue rather than one of pity or charity.29
In 1988, the legislation that would later become the ADA was introduced, but it was repeatedly delayed, due in part to private sector
lobbying.30 In spite of these delays, the legislation enjoyed bipartisan
support and encountered "no serious opposition" in Congress.31 The
legislation was largely modeled after the Rehabilitation Act,32 and it

PARK SERVICE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/articles/disabilityhistoryrightsmovement.htm.
24. Id.; Mayerson, supra note 11.
25. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701–97 (2018)). The Rehabilitation Act foreshadowed many of the provisions of
the ADA. See infra Part I.A.3.
26. Mayerson, supra note 11.
27. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2018)).
28. Mayerson, supra note 11.
29. Meldon, supra note 23.
30. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. (1988); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989). See infra Part II.B for further
discussion of the ADA's legislative history.
31. Ruth Colker, The ADA's Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
2 (2004); see also 134 CONG. REC. 9386, 22, 212–13 (1988) (disability legislation had bipartisan
support and both candidates in the 1988 presidential election were likely to sign it).
32. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9, 25
(1989) (using the same three-pronged definition of disability as in the Rehabilitation Act).
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expressly approved of the Supreme Court's liberal construction of the
act in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.33
On March 12, 1990, disabled individuals purposefully discarded
wheelchairs, walkers, and other mobility aids in order to ascend the
steps of the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.34 This "Capitol
Crawl" called attention to the daily struggles of physically disabled
persons—highlighting the need for accessibility in public spaces—and
was also used to protest the legislative delays.35 A few months later, on
July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the Americans
with Disabilities Act into law.36
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Supreme Court issued a
number of decisions which limited and weakened the ADA.37 In 2008,
though, Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act.38 The act rejected a number of the Supreme Court's decisions and ordered future courts to interpret the ADA broadly.39

3. Substantive provisions of the ADA
The ADA prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees
from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's disability, record of such, or association
with disabled persons.40 Disability is defined as a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity.41

33. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see also H.R. REP. NO.
101-485, pt. 3, at 30, 53; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23.
34. Meldon, supra note 23.
35. Id.
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). The ADA passed 377 to 28 in the House, with 27 abstentions; it passed 91 to 6 in the Senate, with 3 abstentions. Colker, supra note 31, at 26.
37. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). These decisions are further discussed in Part
II.B.3.
38. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)).
39. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) ("The definition of disability in this chapter shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this chapter.").
40. Id. § 12102(1). The term "disability" also applies to those who are "regarded as" having a substantially limiting physical or mental impairment. Id.
41. Id. § 12102(1)(A). The ADA does not apply to LGBTQ-related conditions, sex behavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive gambling, or ongoing substance abuse. Id.
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Major life activities, in turn, include caring for oneself, eating, sleeping, breathing, seeing, and hearing; walking, standing, lifting, and
bending; speaking and communicating; performing manual tasks and
working; reading, thinking, concentrating, and learning; and certain
bodily functions.42
The ADA also requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled employees and job applicants.43 Such accommodations may include adapting employer facilities, providing parking or transit for disabled employees and job applicants, and modifying duties, schedules,
trainings, exams, and internal policies.44 Reasonable accommodations
may also require providing readers or interpreters, reassigning an employee to a vacant position, or granting up to one year of unpaid
leave.45 Though employers choose what accommodations to provide,
courts nevertheless evaluate whether the employer has engaged with
the employee in an "interactive process."46
Employers that violate the ADA may be liable for backpay for up
to two years, front pay, attorneys' fees, and compensatory and punitive
damages.47 Courts may also choose to grant injunctive relief.48 Courts
apply the same evidentiary standards under the ADA as they do for
Title VII claims.49 A plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that he

§ 12211. Impairment is assessed without considering the effects of any corrective measures, except in the case of eyeglasses. Id. § 12102(4)(E).
42. Id. § 12102(2). Impairments that substantially limit bodily functions may include conditions like diabetes or cancer. 45 C.F.R. § 1153.103(1) (2018). But see Susan M. Gibson, The

Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Individuals with a History of Cancer from Employment
Discrimination: Myth or Reality?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167 (1998) (pre-ADAAA inquiry).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
44. Id. § 12111(9).
45. Id.; Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (May 9, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/adaleave.cfm. Employers are generally not required to create a new position for an employee or to
approve indefinite leave or permanent telework. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (indefinite leave); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th
Cir. 1995) (creating a new position); Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telework.html (permanent telework).
46. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (liability is
appropriate where an employer fails to engage in the interactive process and a reasonable accommodation would have otherwise been possible), aff'd 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002).
47. Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/remedies.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2019, 8:04 AM).
48. Id.
49. E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
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or she is disabled, is qualified for the position in question with or without reasonable accommodation, has suffered a materially adverse employment action, and that this action occurred under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.50 The employer may then
refute the plaintiff's case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, and the plaintiff may then
show that the proffered reason is mere pretext and must persuade the
factfinder of the unlawful discrimination's reality.51
The ADA provides essentially two defenses to allegations of disability discrimination. First, employers may escape liability when a disabled employee or job applicant poses a direct threat to health or
safety.52 Second, employers may escape liability when they can prove
their qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria are job-related
and consistent with business necessity.53 Most customer preference defenses fall into the latter category.54

B. The Customer Preferences Problem
Employers frequently discriminate against employees on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and other
untoward factors in order to cater to customer preferences.55 This is
because customers are psychologically primed—and employers are
economically motivated—to act on such preferences.56 Nonetheless,
employers are forbidden from discriminating on these bases in making

50. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
51. Id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA plaintiffs must prove
that age was the sole causal factor). In mixed-motive cases, Title VII plaintiffs must prove that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a factor that led to an adverse employment action.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). At present, courts are divided on which standard applies to ADA
plaintiffs. See also Derek Runyan, Confounding the Courts: The Circuit Courts' Failure to Ar-

ticulate an Appropriate Summary Judgement Standard in Mixed-Motive Individual Disparate
Treatment Claims, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 375, 386–96 (2017) (documenting the current circuit
split).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). This threat may be posed by the disabled person to
themselves or others. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (upholding employer decision to withdraw job offer because of poor condition of applicant's liver,
which could have been worsened by the position); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc.,
276 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding adverse employment action against HIVinfected dental hygienist because of danger of patient infection).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. See id.
56. See infra Part I.B.1 and I.B.2.
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employment decisions.57 Because Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
often conflict with customers' base inclinations and employers' economic incentives, employers frequently attempt to circumvent antidiscrimination law in order to cater to customer preferences. This is
clearly seen with regard to disability discrimination.58

1. The psychology of customer preferences
The tendency for human beings to discriminate based on a desire
to associate with people who are not disabled seems to be psychologically ingrained.59 Researchers have shown that human beings are most
comfortable with others who look like themselves, who have had similar experiences, and who share similar attitudes and personalities.60
Likewise, human beings are predisposed to favor facial symmetry, averageness, and familiarity.61 Many of these preferences are likely based
on what psychologists call the "mere-exposure effect." This effect describes the phenomenon in which people tend to develop preferences
for things that they are familiar with, simply because they are exposed
to them more often.62

57. E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2018)) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of age); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17
(2018)) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018)) (pregnancy); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)) (disability).
58. See infra Part I.B.3.
59. This sentiment is encapsulated by the well-known adage, "birds of a feather flock together." See, e.g., Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
335, 342 (2016) (discussing the phrase and its history).
60. See, e.g., Donn Byrne & William Griffitt, Interpersonal Attraction, 24 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL., 316 (1973) (individuals are attracted to those with similar attitudes); Wu Youyou et
al., Birds of a Feather Do Flock Together: Behavior-Based Personality-Assessment Method Reveals Personality Similarity Among Couples and Friends, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 276, 276–77 (2017)
(individuals are attracted to those with similar personalities); Berit Brogaard, Are We Attracted
to People Who Look Like Us?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 13, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ us/blog/the-mysteries-love/201505/are-we-attracted-people-who-look-us (individuals are attracted to those with similar physical features).
61. See, e.g., Anthony C. Little et al., Facial Attractiveness: Evolutionary Based Research,
366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y 1638 (2011).
62. See, e.g., Angela Y. Lee, The Mere Exposure Effect: Is It a Mere Case of Misattribution?, 21 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 270, 270-75 (Chris T. Allen & Deborah Roedder John eds., 1994) (describing the mere exposure effect with regard to product placement);
Patricia Pliner, The Effects of Mere Exposure on Liking for Edible Substances, 3 APPETITE: J.
FOR INTAKE RES. 283 (1982) (food); Leslie A. Zebrowitz, et al., Mere Exposure and Racial Prejudice: Exposure to Other-Race Faces Increases Liking for Strangers of that Race, 26 SOC.
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These psychological underpinnings tend to result in customer discrimination against disabled employees because most people do not
have either actual or apparent disabilities, and so the characteristics,
experiences, and personalities of disabled persons tend to be unfamiliar
to customers generally.63 Likewise, some disabilities, such as the loss
of a limb, disfiguring diseases, and certain types of autism, can result
in bodily asymmetry.64 Disabilities in general are often evidenced by
atypical physical and mental characteristics, and these characteristics
are often met with fear and prejudice by the general population.65

2. The economics of customer preferences
Customers are free, of course, to choose not to patronize businesses because of their employees.66 Employers are not free, however,
to discriminate against employees in order to cater to untoward customer preferences.67 Because employers have strong economic incentives to do so, they often discriminate against disfavored individuals in
order to cater to untoward customer preferences.68

COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 259 (2008) (race).
63. See Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4
(2012), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/demo/p70-131.html (less than twenty
percent of the population of the United States suffers from a disability). While many people may
have disabled family members, friends, neighbors, etc., an even lesser percentage of Americans
suffer from visible disabilities, and the symptoms of individual disabilities are wide-ranging.
64. E.g., ADNP Syndrome, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/adnp-syndrome (last visited Jan. 9, 2019, 9:48 AM) (distinctive facial features of ADNP, a type of autism).
65. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[S]ociety's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment."); Jessica Scheer, They Act Like It's Contagious: A
Study of Mobility Impairment in a New York City Neighborhood, in SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
CHRONIC ILLNESS, IMPAIRMENT AND DISABILITY 62 (Stephen C. Hey et al. eds., 1984) (documenting fears that disabled persons threaten the health and safety of others); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12113(e) (2018) (public concern surrounding HIV and AIDS); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D.
Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 328–
35 (2004) (same).
66. But see Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102
IOWA L. REV. 223 (2016) (proposing that Congress extend civil rights laws to cover customer
discrimination directly).
67. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); id. § 12112
(disability); see also Tamosaitis v. URS, Inc. 781 F.3d 468, 482 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[W]e have long
held that a customer's discriminatory preference does not justify an employer's discriminatory
practice.").
68. See infra Part I.C.
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In order to stay in business and turn a profit, businesses must attract and retain customers; in order to attract and retain customers,
businesses must satisfy customer demands. These demands are usually
reasonable, such as expecting reliable, courteous, and responsive service or preferring attractive corporate images, quality products, and
low prices.69 But customer demands may also develop out of irrational
fears and prejudices. Businesses often summarize the need to cater to
customer preferences with sweeping phrases like "the customer is always right," "customer satisfaction is our highest priority," and "the
customer is king."70 Such phrases have frequently been criticized by
courts and commentators because they do not account for irrational
fears and prejudices, but they are still pervasive in the business world.71
Businesses are conditioned to cater to customer preferences in almost
every regard, and it is naturally difficult for employers to divorce themselves from normal economic incentives in order to comply with legal
mandates. As a result, customer psychology and economic reality
prompt businesses to discriminate on the basis of disability and other
unlawful factors.

3. The reality of customer preferences
Businesses discriminate on the basis of untoward customer preferences with disconcerting regularity. Fifty years of caselaw attests that
attempts to raise customer preferences in defense to charges of discrimination will not be going away, and that businesses are consistently

69. See generally ART WEINSTEIN, SUPERIOR CUSTOMER VALUE: STRATEGIES FOR
WINNING AND RETAINING CUSTOMERS (3d ed. 2012).
70. Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2174 n.15 (2018); Lea B.
Vaughn, The Customer is Always Right. . . Not: Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 13–14 (2002). Phrases like these are long-lived and still
pervasive. See, e.g., Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that the business principle of "the customer is always right" provided a legitimate reason
to discipline an employee following a customer complaint); Charles T. LeViness, Caveat Emptor
Versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REV. 177, 178 (1943) (detailing the origins and history of the
phrase "the customer is always right").
71. Some phrases may even be seen as inviting discrimination and harassment. See
Vaughn, supra note 70, at n.45 (Kmart slogan "I'm here for you" viewed as inviting harassment);
see also Callwood v. Dave & Buster's, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Md. 2000) ("The days of
'the customer is always right' [as a cognizable defense or justification] are long past."); Alicia A.
Grandey et al., The Customer is Not Always Right: Customer Aggression and Emotion Regulation of Service Employees, 25 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 397 (2004) (describing the idiom's
contemporary prevalence).
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ignorant or dismissive of antidiscrimination law on this point.72 In addition, customer preference defenses are beginning to evolve to cover
discrimination by customers directly,73 as well as discrimination that is
based on customer feedback74 and discrimination that is perpetuated
by customers when they take the place of traditional supervisors or
employers.75
Customer preference discrimination on the basis of disability is no
less prevalent than in the context of race, sex, age, or other characteristics. Employers often justify discrimination against disabled employees by asserting that their quality of work is lower than what the customer demands.76 Businesses also justify discrimination against
disabled persons by alleging customer aversion to the appearance,
mannerisms, or personalities of disabled employees.77 Some employers
have even gone so far as to systematically record customer preferences
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 586–87
(6th Cir. 2018) (funeral home attempting to argue that transgender employee would present a
distraction that would obstruct the funeral home's ability to serve grieving families); Chaney v.
Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913–14 (7th Cir. 2010) (nursing home attempting to
argue that its policy of acceding to patients' preferences for nurses of a certain race was reasonable); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SIGNIFICANT EEOC RACE/COLOR CASES,
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/initiatives/e-race/caselist.cfm?renderforprint=1#customer
(last
visited Jan. 9, 2019, 12:51 PM) (hospital attempting to argue that acceding to father's demand
that no African-American nurses treat his newborn was reasonable; employer attempting to argue
that its refusal to promote an employee was reasonable based on its belief that customers in "redneck country" would not accept an African-American account manager). Court cases are, of
course, only a small percentage of actual customer preference-based discrimination.
73. Juan M. Madera et al., Wait! What About Customer-Based Subtle Discrimination?,
10 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 107, 107-10 (2017) (arguing that service industry
employees are particularly vulnerable to direct discrimination from customers in the form of
rudeness, lower tips, etc.); see also Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 249, 250 (2016).
74. Flake, supra note 70, at 2172–73 (discussing implicit bias and customer feedback
mechanisms); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1416–17 (2009)
(customer feedback mechanisms allow employers to "launder out" discriminatory intent).
75. Alex Kirven, Comment, Whose Gig Is It Anyway: Technological Change, Workplace
Control and Supervision, and Workers' Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249,
285 (2018) (describing conventions at Uber and Lyft where customers rate drivers without
higher-level review).
76. See, e.g., Combes v. AIG Consultants, Inc., No. 95 C 1865, 1996 WL 596397 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 10, 1996) (finding that client's preference for service by a non-disabled employee was
based on quality of work product).
77. See, e.g., Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va.
1989) (alleging that woman missing an eye was not fit to be seen by vendors) (pre-ADA state law
claim); Adam R. Pulver, An Imperfect Fit: Obesity, Public Health, and Disability Antidiscrimination Law, 41 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 365, 396–98 (2008) (discussing scholarship surrounding cases that have held that discrimination on the basis of customer aversion to obesity is permissible).
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for nondisabled employees in order to more effectively screen disabled
employees from contact with prejudiced customers.78 Because of the
psychology and economics of customer preference, disability discrimination by businesses is, and will likely continue to be, an unfortunate
reality.

C. Customer Preferences as a Defense to Discrimination
In general, customer preferences are not a defense to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability.79 There are essentially three exceptions, however. Courts
have recognized customer preferences as a defense for issues that pertain to safety, privacy, and authenticity, respectively.80 These are the
only exceptions under Title VII and the ADEA, and courts tend to be
skeptical of customer preference defenses in such cases. In practice,
however, many courts also recognize a fourth exception for ADA
claims; namely, that some employees and job applicants are "unfit to
be seen" by customers.81 This covert exception is essentially a reformulation of the ugly laws of the late-1800s and should be expressly
repudiated.

1. Customer preferences under Title VII and the ADEA
Before turning to the judiciary's treatment of customer preference
in disability discrimination cases, it is helpful to consider how this defense is treated in other contexts. Customer preferences are not generally a defense to claims under Title VII or the ADEA.82 Courts have
applied this rule consistently to claims alleging discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age.

78. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cornwell Pers. Assocs., Ltd., No. 95-C-854, 1995 WL 788208
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 1995) (business recording client preferences for employees of a particular
disability status).
79. See infra Part I.C.1.
80. See infra Part I.C.2.
81. Hodgdon v. Mount Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1132 (Vt. 1992); see infra Part
I.C.3.
82. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The existence of . . . third party preferences for discrimination does not . . . justify discriminatory hiring
practices."); Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md. Oct.
15, 2015) ("An employer may not immunize its actions by ducking behind the preferences of a
client."); Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("While pandering to
customers' discriminatory preferences could very well help effectuate a sale, employers nevertheless 'may not discriminate on the basis of their customers' preferences.'") (citations omitted)
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Race and color are not included in the section of Title VII that
describes bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs).83 This omission was likely deliberate,84 and courts have consistently held that customer preferences cannot justify discrimination on the basis of race or
color.85 To date, courts have only recognized two scenarios in which
race may be a BFOQ—law enforcement operations and acting.86
Non-religious employers are prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of religion in employment, and discriminatory customer preferences are not usually a defense.87 When an employee's need for accommodation of a religious practice, observance, or good faith belief
conflicts with customer preferences, however, courts have held that
this imposes more than a de minimis burden on an employer and thus
are willing to find undue hardship.88 Religious employers can discriminate on the basis of religion in employment, including in positions
that are non-religious.89 Religious employers may also discriminate on
any basis in the hiring and employment of ministers and other clergy.90

(quoting Wigginess, Inc., v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business . . . .") (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), reversed and
remanded, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
85. See Knight v. Nassau Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
86. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980)
(acting); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (undercover
infiltration of an all-black criminal organization); see also 110 Cong. Rec. 7213,7217 (1964)
(comments of Senator Clifford Case on acting).
87. See, e.g., Balk v. New York Inst. of Tech., 683 F. App'x 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).
88. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
89. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (2018) (The ADA does not prohibit religious organizations
"from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the [organization]" or from requiring "that all applicants and employees conform
to the religious tenets of [the] organization."); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (discussing the religious organization exception's application to non-religious activities); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450
F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the exception generally); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(a)
(2018) (religious organizations nonetheless "may not discriminate against a qualified individual,
who satisfies the permitted religious criteria, because of his or her disability.").
90. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171 (2012) (discussing this ministerial exception and interpreting "minister" broadly); see also
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (incorporating the ministerial exception into
ADA caselaw), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
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The general rule against customer preference-based defenses developed primarily within the context of sex discrimination in the airline
industry.91 This prohibition has since been extended to cover sex discrimination in most other industries.92 Courts have, however, recognized a narrow exception for cases involving sexual titillation.93 Customer preference defenses that are proffered in response to allegations
of national origin and age discrimination have likewise been found to
be unpersuasive.94

2. Safety, privacy, and authenticity exceptions
Courts have essentially recognized three exceptions to the general
rule against customer preference-based defenses. These exceptions are
for customer preferences that bear upon safety, privacy, or authenticity.95
Concerns regarding the first exception, safety, must generally be
well-founded and substantial. For example, courts have upheld a customer preference-based defense where the threat of death was prescribed by law.96 Courts have not upheld the defense in cases where the

91. Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (striking down weight requirements which were proportionally skewed and imposed a greater burden on female flight attendants), cert. denied 532 U.S. 914 (2001); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th
Cir. 1971) ("[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of
the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid."); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting defendant's arguments that sex appeal was part
of the essence of its business).
92. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (employers cannot refuse to hire women based on customer preferences for men) (chemical manufacturer).
93. See infra Part I.C.2.
94. E.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (1994) ("The existence of such
third party preferences for [national origin] discrimination does not, of course, justify discriminatory hiring practices."); Silver v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding defendants' attempts to shift blame to others in an age discrimination suit to be
unpersuasive); Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that
a supervisor's remark that customers related better to people who looked like them was evidence
of national origin discrimination).
95. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F.L. REV. 473, 484 (2001)
(discussing these exceptions). Some courts recognize an exception for customer preferences that
pertain to the "essence" of employers' businesses, but this is generally equivalent to the authenticity exception. See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 299.
96. Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (company refused
to hire non-Muslim helicopter pilots for flights to Mecca because Saudi Arabian law made entry
by non-Muslims punishable by beheading), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
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threat was nebulous or hypothetical.97 In addition, courts have recognized preferences that pertain to the safety of customers, as well as
preferences that pertain to the safety of others.98 Safety-related age
BFOQs have been upheld in various contexts, including for pilots, police officers, firefighters, bus drivers, and where certain physical requirements are necessary for efficient job performance.99
Concerns regarding the second exception, privacy, generally bear
upon customer or third-party aversion to being seen without clothes
by a member of the opposite sex.100 These concerns tend to arise in
settings like hospitals, nursing homes, bathrooms, and prisons.101 In
some instances, courts defer to such customer preferences in part because of the Constitution's protections for privacy.102
Concerns regarding the last exception, authenticity, are often ambiguous and have only been recognized in a limited number of circumstances. Customer preference-based discrimination is allowed in the

97. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd
in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (feeble concern for the safety of Jewish staff members not a
defense for excluding them from a program in Saudi Arabia).
98. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding a ban on females
serving in "contact positions" at an all-male penitentiary because of concerns for order and because of the potential for assault); EEOC v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 710 F.2d 1091, 1097
(5th Cir. 1983) (upholding university's practice of only hiring campus police officers under the
age of forty-five because such officers were purportedly better able to deal with students).
99. See, e.g., Correa-Ruiz v. Calderon-Serra, 411 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.P.R. 2005) (police
officers). See generally Frank J. Cavico & Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, The Bona Fide Occupational

Qualification (BFOQ) Defense in Employment Discrimination: A Narrow and Limited Justification Exception, 7 J. BUS. STUD. Q. 15 (2016).
100. See Healy v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring
at least one staff member of each gender to be available to patients at all times); Jones v. Hinds
Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding practice of only allowing male nurses
to administer catheters for male patients); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–W,
1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okl. Feb. 02, 1982) ("intimate duties"). See generally Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004).
101. Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding prison policy designating certain positions as female-only to preserve prisoner privacy); Norwood v. Dale Maint.
Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (washroom attendants); Fesel v. Masonic Home of
Del., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding
nursing home's refusal to hire male attendants given customer preference for females). But see
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F. 2d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (declining to uphold prison policy
of refusing to hire females in order to preserve prisoner privacy).
102. See Jones v. Henryville Corr. Facility, 220 F. Supp. 3d 923, 929 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
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case of actors and actresses,103 restaurants projecting an authentic atmosphere,104 and other comparable situations.105 Courts have attempted to limit the authenticity exception to practices that pertain to
a business's "essence,"106 though commentators have criticized this distinction since businesses often engage in many different enterprises
and have multiple purposes.107

3. Customer preferences under the ADA
At first glance, customer preferences are not a defense to disability
discrimination either.108 In reality, though, courts are often more willing to recognize customer preferences for ADA claims than for claims
under Title VII or the ADEA.109 This is particularly troubling in the
context of the "unfit to be seen" exception. While many courts at least
pay lip service to the general rule against customer preference-based
defenses, some essentially agree to reappropriate the ugly laws of the
late-1800s for the use of modern employers.110
For example, in one case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the discharge
of a disabled salesperson in part because his epileptic seizures allegedly
upset customers.111 There, an epileptic man worked for a shoe retailer

103. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2018) ("[T]he following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: . . . refusal to hire an individual because
of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except . . . [w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, . . . e.g., an actor or actress.").
104. Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (upholding Chinese restaurant's policy requiring workers to be of Chinese nationality).
105. See, e.g., Cavico & Mujtaba, supra note 99, at 22–23 (discussing the Walt Disney
Company's successful practice of hiring workers to match theme park cultural areas so as to provide visitors with authentic experiences).
106. See, Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
107. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 100, at 167.
108. E.g., EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 (10th Cir. 2011).
109. Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality: Some Reflections on the Interpretation
of Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345 n.52 (1996) ("[T]he
[customer preference strain of the BFOQ] defense retains some vitality, both in the disability
discrimination context and elsewhere."). But see, Mark. R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title

VII and Trait Discrimination Plus One Simple Solution: A Totality of the Circumstances Framework, 37 CAP. U.L. REV. 965, 1006 (2009) ("Congress and the courts seem to exhibit a bit more
concern about the potential prejudices faced by disabled in appearance policies than by those
encountered by the original protected classes in Title VII.").
110. See C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d at 1039 ("At the outset, we acknowledge that an
employer's accommodation of the discriminatory preferences of other employees, clients, or customers could, under certain circumstances, expose the employer to liability for discrimination.")
(finding for the employer).
111. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
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for several years before being hired on full-time.112 The retailer was
aware of the man's epilepsy, and the man requested accommodation in
the form of tolerance for his periodic fainting spells.113 The retailer
admitted that the man was reliable, fully capable of performing his job,
and a good salesperson—and that his seizures did not cause the store
to lose customers.114 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit upheld the discharge, which was motivated by concerns that the man's seizures could
have theoretically caused the retailer to lose customers.115
In another instance, a federal district court declined to inquire into
the true motives behind a client's preference for service from a nondisabled employee.116 Instead, the court decided that the preference
must have been based solely on the quality of the employee's work
product.117 In another, the federal district court disregarded evidence
of coworker comments complaining about the workload they were
forced to shoulder in order to facilitate accommodations for a disabled
worker.118
In yet another case, a federal district court upheld the suspension
and constructive discharge of a disabled doorman.119 The adverse employment actions occurred directly after customer complaints about
the doorman's body odor and bad breath, both of which were possible
symptoms of his disability.120 The court, however, chose to view these
symptoms as independent of the disability.121 This lack of analysis is
typical. Instead of addressing the customer preference issue directly,
federal courts often choose to skirt it by disregarding potentially incriminating evidence.

112. Id. at 685.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 427 n.5 (W.D. Va. 1996) (citing
deposition testimony which expressed concern that the seizures impacted customers), aff'd 104
F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
116. Combes v. AIG Consultants, Inc., No. 95 C 1865, 1996 WL 596397 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
10, 1996).
117. See id.
118. See Kazmierski v. Bonafide Safe & Lock, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 838, 847 (E.D. Wis.
2016); see also EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 (10th Cir. 2011) (disregarding
evidence that an employer discouraged coworkers from working with plaintiff-employee by making them sign a form acknowledging the employee's HIV-positive status).
119. Seeman v. Gracie Gardens Owners Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479–80 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
120. Id. at 478–79.
121. Id. at 480–83.
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Courts addressing state law claims have been more explicit in their
acceptance of discriminatory customer preferences. In one instance,
the West Virginia Supreme Court denied the disability discrimination
claim of a grocery store assistant manager who was missing an eye.122
The individual was denied a promotion because of her "deformed"
physical appearance.123 The West Virginia Supreme Court gave credence to the employer's concerns that the employee's artificial eye
would not be something a vendor or customer "would like to encounter."124
In another particularly callous instance, the Vermont Supreme
Court denied a worker's disability claim in order to defer to customer
preferences.125 There, a disabled woman who was missing her upper
teeth worked as a chambermaid at a ski resort.126 The woman was terminated because the ski resort believed she was "unfit to be seen by
customers."127 The state supreme court endorsed the employer's view
that "a particular physical condition [may be] a bona fide occupational
qualification for [a] particular job," even where the condition is related
to disability.128
These federal and state cases illustrate two principles which characterize many courts' attitudes toward disability discrimination. The
first is general disregard. Courts are often too willing to look the other
way when discrimination motivated by customer preferences rears its
head. Many cases that clearly implicate untoward customer preferences lack analysis on the subject, and courts too often discount evidence that would otherwise support allegations of disability discrimination.
The second principle illustrated by these cases is that courts are
often unduly sympathetic to the position of employers. Many courts
disregard discrimination's effects on disabled employees in order to
focus on business "necessities." These courts focus on finding that an
employer had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse
employment action, on the disabled employee's inability to perform
the essential job functions of the position, and on how the symptoms
122. Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 77 (W.Va. 1989).
It should also be noted that this case was decided shortly before the ADA was enacted. See id.
123. Id. at 77–78.
124. Id. at 78.
125. Hodgdon v. Mount Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1992).
126. Id. at 1124.
127. Id. at 1132.
128. Id.
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of the disability render the individual "unfit," rather than on the underlying discrimination.129 Thus, a certain subset of courts essentially
recognize an unsavory exception to the general rule against customer
preference-based defenses when disabled employees are deemed "unfit
to be seen."130

ffK=^å~äóëáë=çÑ=íÜÉ=^a^=~åÇ=`ìëíçãÉê=mêÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë==
The "unfit to be seen" exception, which tacitly recognizes customer aversion to disabled workers as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for adverse employment decisions, is not contemplated by the
ADA. The exception is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the statute,
and sublimating customer preferences probably qualifies as a reasonable accommodation. The exception is also contradicted by the broad
remedial purpose of the ADA, as seen in the act's legislative history
and express allocation of costs. The exception gives undue weight to
the costs businesses bear in sublimating untoward customer preferences, and it is unfair to disabled workers. For these reasons, the "unfit
to be seen" exception to the general rule against customer preferencebased defenses should be expressly rejected by Congress; in the alternative, courts should cease to recognize it.

A. The Text of the ADA
The text of the ADA does not directly address customer preferences. Nonetheless, it broadly proscribes disability discrimination, and
it does not mention customer preferences alongside the act's other recognized defenses.131 The ADA also requires employers to reasonably
accommodate disabled employees and job applicants, and this requirement likely encompasses the possibility of foregoing individual customers because of a refusal to condone animus.132 Thus, the text of the

129. In finding the symptoms of disability to be disqualifying, courts tend to overlook the
realities of employment discrimination. Few employers discriminate against disabled persons because they are classed as disabled. Instead, employers discriminate because they find the symptoms of disability to be disadvantageous. Discrimination on the basis of the symptoms of disability
is disability discrimination.
130. Hodgdon, 624 A.2d at 1132.
131. See infra Part II.A.1.
132. See infra Part II.A.2.
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ADA likely prohibits most customer preference-based defenses to discrimination, and it certainly prohibits the "unfit to be seen" variety of
the defense.

1. "No covered entity shall discriminate."
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability [with regard to
the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."133 This broad
prohibition against disability discrimination must be the backdrop for
any analysis of whether the ADA contemplates customer preferencebased defenses.134 In general, all affirmative defenses are an exception
to the usual rule against disability discrimination, and the defendant
bears the burden of proof.135 Unlike Title VII, the ADA provides some
clarification as to the meaning of "discriminate," namely that it includes limiting an employee or job applicant in any way that adversely
affects his or her employment opportunities or status.136 This likely
applies to situations where an employer "limits" a disabled employee
by prohibiting him or her from having contact with a customer or
other third party,137 which could affect employment opportunities like
commissions, bonuses, promotions, training, experience, etc. The
ADA also states that discrimination includes utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that effectuate disability discrimination or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
the employer's administrative control.138 While customers may not be

133. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018).
134. The first step in statutory interpretation is to find the ordinary meaning of a statute's
language. E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); W. Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991); Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552, 552 (1990); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
135. Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 221-22 (1991) ("The burden
of proving that a discriminatory qualification is a BFOQ . . . rests with the employer.") (citing
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 333 (1977)).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
137. See, e.g., Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 77–78
(W.Va. 1989) (employer viewing contact with vendors as undesirable).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) ("[T]he term 'discriminate . . . ' [includes] utilizing standards,
criteria or methods of administration . . . that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are
subject to common administrative control.").
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subject to the employer's "administrative" control, employers do exercise some control over their clientele and this principle may reasonably
be extended to the customer preference defense.139
The ADA's purpose section sheds further light on when customer
preference defenses are allowable.140 First, the act finds that "physical
or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society."141 The right to full participation in
society likely includes the right to be free from discrimination based
on an employer's desire to cater to customer preferences. In addition,
Congress stated that the goal of the ADA is "to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency" for disabled individuals.142 This goal is largely thwarted
when courts allow customer preference-based defenses, particularly
those of the "unfit to be seen" variety.
The ADA does not expressly provide for a customer preference
BFOQ defense.143 Instead, the ADA allows the defendant to raise an
affirmative defense either when a disabled employee or job applicant
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of themselves or others, or
when the employer uses criteria that are "job-related and consistent
with business necessity" and performance cannot be accomplished
with reasonable accommodation.144 Customer preferences that pertain
to significant health or safety risks are clearly codified as a defense under the ADA.145 The second situation is essentially a reformulation of
Title VII's BFOQ and business necessity defenses.146 It is this defense
139. See Folkerson v. Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997) (employer liable
for harassment by patron if it knew or should have known of the harassment and took insufficient
remedial action). This provision of the statute clearly applies to coworker preferences. Cf. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484–86
(1999) (citing ADA's legislative findings); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588–90 (1981)
(consulting statute's findings and purpose section); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 292 n.9 (1977)
(consulting statute's declaration of policy section).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
142. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
143. See id. § 12113.
144. Id. § 12113(a).
145. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the

Corpus of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 113–20 (1993) (discussing what risks are "significant").
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); cf. id. § 2000e-2(e), (k); see also Morton v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the defenses available under the
ADA). But see Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruling Morton, but doing so in part because the ADA's business necessity defense also necessitates
reasonable accommodation and noting that the defense still applies to disparate treatment
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that arguably covers the rest of the customer preference-based defenses.147 The ADA's business necessity defense is couched in qualifying language, however,148 and the Supreme Court has stated that this
type of affirmative defense "provides only the narrowest of exceptions
to the general rule requiring equality of employment opportunities."149
It is debatable whether customer preferences are reasonably job-related since they are often based on psychologically engrained, but unfounded fears and prejudices rather than concerns that are rational or
proven.150 And though customer preferences might at least theoretically constitute business necessity, most of the time the ADA's reasonable accommodation provisions require their sublimation.151 The text
of the ADA thus mitigates against allowing the "unfit to be seen" variety of the customer preference defense.

2. Reasonable accommodation
The ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees and job applicants unless the accommodation would result
in undue hardship.152 Sublimating customer preferences, particularly
preferences for avoiding interactions with disabled employees, is likely
a reasonable accommodation. Most reasonable accommodations require employers to incur some sort of expense, whether it be paying
other employees to modify trainings or exams, providing readers or
interpreters, adapting facilities to increase accessibility, or something
else.153 Requiring employers to forgo the business of certain customers
imposes similar costs.154 On the other hand, however, these costs are
claims).
147. If this were not so, the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius would dictate
that customer preference defenses do not apply to disability discrimination in any form. See generally Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33
CAMPBELL L. REV. 115, 130–37 (2010).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (showing that criteria are job-related and consistent with business necessity "may be a defense to a charge of discrimination") (emphasis added).
149. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
150. See supra Part I.A.1.
151. See supra Part II.A.2.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2018). This is true regardless of
whether the employer raises an affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
153. See, e.g., J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903 (2003) (discussing the costs of accommodation and the ADA generally).
154. Most costs associated with reasonable accommodations are minor. Andrew Houtenville & Valentini Kalargyrou, People with Disabilities: Employers' Perspectives on Recruitment
Practices, Strategies, and Challenges in Leisure and Hospitality, 53 CORNELL HOSPITALITY Q.
40, 42 (2011) (noting that over seventy percent of accommodations in the hospitality industry
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of a different nature from the usual costs of accommodation since they
may be indeterminate and are not undertaken affirmatively.155 But because all major businesses must comply with the ADA, these costs are
borne by all employers alike, lessening any individualized burden. Customers that opt to "take their business elsewhere" may very well be
forced to return to original, nondiscriminatory businesses after finding
that their untoward tastes are not tolerated anywhere. In any case,
these costs are precisely the kind which the ADA allocates to employers.
Accommodations requiring employers to sublimate customer preferences would not usually impose undue hardship on employers, either. For an employer to show hardship under the ADA, it must incur
"significant difficulty or expense."156 In evaluating whether an accommodation imposes undue hardship on an employer, the ADA allows
for consideration of the nature and cost of the accommodation; the
resources and number of employees of the facility in question; the resources and number of employees of the business as a whole; and the
organizational, geographic, and fiscal relationships of the facility to the
business.157 Thus, the only time that sublimating customer preferences
would be likely to impose undue hardship on an employer is when the
costs are substantial when compared to the employer's size.158 Scenarios where small, modern-day employers are driven to the verge of
bankruptcy after employing disabled persons solely because of unto-

cost less than five hundred dollars and twenty percent cost nothing).
155. In this regard, these costs may be comparable to requested accommodations for indefinite leave. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999); U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING
PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (Dec. 20,
2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html#fn77 ("[G]ranting indefinite
leave . . . can impose an undue hardship on an employer's operations.").
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
157. See id. § 12111(10)(B); see also Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and
Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2010) ("The duty to accommodate is a substantial
obligation, . . . one that is not subject to a cost-benefit balance but instead to a cost-resource
balance . . . ; it is also . . . liable to increase over time."); Julie Brandfield, Undue Hardship: Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 127 (1990) ("[P]rofitability
and morale are at the essence of the four statutory factors.").
158. Lisa A. Lavelle, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (1991) (discussing the ADA's impact on small businesses); Weber,
supra note 157, at 1150–51 (reasonable accommodation may require significant effort and costs,
can be expensive, and need not accrue to the benefit of an employer).
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ward customer preferences are more at home in academic hypotheticals than in the real world, however.159 As such, it is probably reasonable to expect employers to sublimate customer preferences in order to
accommodate disabled employees. On the whole, the text of the ADA
mitigates against allowing employers to discriminate against disabled
persons in order to pander to discriminatory customer preferences.

B. The Legislative History of the ADA
Where the text of a statute is not dispositive, courts often consult
legislative history to aid in statutory construction.160 The text of the
ADA indicates that the act proscribes disability discrimination based
on untoward customer preferences, and this reading is confirmed by
the statute's legislative history. This history shows that the ADA was
meant to have a broad remedial purpose,161 that Congress was aware of
the costs the act would impose on employers, and that it did not intend
courts to give undue weight to customer preference-based defenses.162
Again, this is particularly true with respect to the "unfit to be seen"
variety of the customer preference defense.

1. The broad remedial purpose of the ADA
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA in order to combat discrimination against persons with disabilities;163 therefore, the broad remedial purpose of the ADA likely includes disallowing most customer
preference-based defenses. The statute expressly describes its purpose
as,
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in

159. See Lavelle, supra note 158, at 1186 n.283 (discussing the original draft of the ADA's
"bankruptcy" exception).
160. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010). The text here is likely dispositive, but since the legislative history confirms this reading it may still be informative.
161. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.
163. See supra Part I.A; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989) (statement of President
George H. W. Bush) ("[S]tatistics consistently demonstrate that disabled people are the poorest . . . and largest minority in America.").
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enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . . . in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people
with disabilities.164This statement indicates that the act's broad remedial purpose includes curtailing individual preferences for discrimination on the basis of disability.165
The ADA's broad antidiscrimination mandate was well understood
by both proponents and opponents of the act, and the legislative record
is rife with statements which show the legislature's broad intentions.166
The legislative history of the act also indicates that part of its purpose
was to help integrate disabled persons "into the economic and social
mainstream of American life,"167 and that this included limiting discrimination on the basis of customer preferences.168
Congress first took up the subject of disability discrimination in
response to the HIV and AIDS crises which were then particularly
prominent issues of public concern.169 As part of the debate surrounding these topics, Representative Jim Chapman proposed an amendment to the ADA in order to permit employers to bar employees with
communicable diseases from food handling positions.170 Congress,
however, rejected the idea that customer preferences or phobias may
be a defense to discrimination.171

164. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018).
165. Since Congress cannot regulate customer preferences directly, it does so indirectly
through businesses. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 66, at 227 ("[T]he regulation of firms alone
is sufficient to achieve society's nondiscrimination goals.").
166. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 19,810 (1989) (statement of Sen. David Durenberger)
("[T]he basic principle of this legislation [is] to provide a clear and comprehensive prohibition
against discrimination against persons with disabilities."); id. at 19, 803 (remarks of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) (the ADA's objective was to establish a clear, comprehensive prohibition against disability
discrimination); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (discussing the act's broad remedial purpose);
Colker, supra note 31, at 26 ("[B]oth the proponents and opponents of the ADA understood the
definition of disability to have a very broad scope.").
167. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
446.
168. Id. at 30.
169. Colker, supra note 31, at 2, 6 (describing Congress's "overwhelming commitment to
cover individuals with HIV infection"); see also 135 CONG. REC. 22,734 (1989) (statement of
Rep. Dan Burton displaying homophobia in opposition to the legislation).
170. Colker, supra note 31, at 21.
171. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 493–94 (1991) (discussing Chapman's proposed amendment in relation to Congress's rejection of customer preference defenses).
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2. The costs of the ADA and undue hardship
The costs incurred by employers in failing to cater to discriminatory customer preferences likely do not rise to the level of undue hardship, for several reasons.172 First, the legislative history of the ADA
shows that Congress was well aware of the costs the act would impose
on employers.173 For instance, despite extensive consideration of an
amendment first proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch, Congress chose
not to allow small businesses a tax credit in accordance with their efforts to accommodate disabled employees.174 Second, the legislative
history indicates that costs must be significant in order to constitute
undue hardship under the ADA.175 For instance, the House rejected an
amendment that would have imposed a presumption of undue hardship when the costs of accommodation exceeded ten percent of the
disabled employee's annual salary or wages—a threshold that would be
difficult to meet in many scenarios.176 Third, the legislative history indicates that Congress was reticent to allow employers to discriminate
against disabled workers even when the employer would suffer undue
hardship.177
Congress also used language similar to that found in Title VII and
was presumptively cognizant of Title VII's lack of a general customer
preference defense.178 In addition, arguments that customers might refuse to patronize restaurants that employed persons with disabilities
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
173. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 19,881–82 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey
opposing the act's "monumental" costs).
174. See Colker, supra note 31, at 20–22.
175. 135 CONG. REC. 19,872.
176. See 136 CONG. REC. 10,903–09 (1990).
177. See S. 2345, at § 3(5) (1988) (enacted) (defining reasonable accommodation without
providing an undue hardship exception). But see Colker, supra note 31, at 10–11 (describing the
reservations of multiple senators with regard to the exclusion of an undue hardship exception).
Of course, the failure of Congress to enact this bill and the eventual inclusion of an undue hardship exception may easily mitigate the other way. Here, any reliance on legislative history would
encounter the oft-cited criticism that doing so is akin to looking over a crowd and picking out
one's friends. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. 136 CONG. REC. 10,856 (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer) ("Whenever possible, we
have used terms of art from the 1964 Civil Rights Act and from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
phrases already interpreted in courts throughout this land so that business can know exactly what
we mean."); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008). When Congress uses words or
concepts with meanings established elsewhere, courts presume their meanings are the same. See,
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–24 (1992); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496
U.S. 478, 484 (1990); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988). This presumption is stronger when statutes contain similar subject matter. See, e.g.,
Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986).
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were met with fierce opposition and repeatedly characterized as promoting fear and prejudice.179 Congress was aware of the costs businesses would incur in order to comply with the ADA, and it did not
believe that these costs generally rose to the level of undue hardship.

3. The broad remedial purpose of the ADAAA
The ADAAA's reaffirmation of the broad prohibition against disability discrimination further mitigates against most forms of the customer preference defense. After the ADA was passed in 1990, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions which severely limited its
scope. For instance, the Court required substantial limitation to be
proven after corrective measures were taken,180 and it held that "mere
difference" between an individual's ability to perform a major life activity and an average person's ability to do so was not a substantial limitation.181 The Court questioned whether working was a major life activity,182 and it strengthened language surrounding substantial
impairments and major life activities.183 As a result, the ADA of the
1990s and early-2000s was a largely ineffective statute.184
In 2008, Congress reemphasized the broad scope of the ADA by
passing the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act.185 Congress passed this act largely in response to the Supreme Court's narrowing decisions, stating amongst other things that the standards imposed by the Court "created an inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA."186 Congress specifically

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
relied on

136 CONG. REC. 10,913 (statements of Rep. Henry Waxman and Rep. Steve Bartlett).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999).
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). These decisions
the EEOC's regulations. See, e.g., Kate S. Arduini, Note, Why the Americans with

Disabilities Act Amendments Act is Destined to Fail: Lack of Protection for the "Truly" Disabled, Impracticability of Employer Compliance, and the Negative Impact It Will Have on Our
Already Struggling Economy, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 161, 169–71 (2009).
184. See, e.g., Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 23 REG. 21, 21 (2000) ("[S]tudies of the consequences of the employment provisions of the ADA show that the Act has led to less employment of disabled workers.").
185. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2018)).
186. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(a)(8), (b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § (2)(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 (overturning the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the "regarded as" prong).
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rewrote the statute to require that the definition of disability be construed broadly.187 As a result, any attempt to raise customer preferences
as a defense to discrimination must be read in this light. Customer
preferences will seldom justify businesses flouting the broad remedial
purpose of the ADA since Congress has clearly indicated that the costs
of accommodating disabled workers are to be borne by employers.

C. The Policies of the ADA
In enacting the ADA, Congress essentially balanced two policies—
the costs employers incur in avoiding disability discrimination and the
unfairness of discrimination faced by disabled persons—and chose to
prioritize the latter.188 The costs of sublimating customer preferences
are usually minor and are often offset by positive externalities resulting
from diversity and inclusion.189 In part because disabilities are substantially similar to immutable characteristics covered by Title VII and the
ADEA, it is unfair to allow employment discrimination against disabled persons simply because of the irrational tastes of an employer's
customers.190 Congress's legislative choices are entitled to deference,
and the judiciary's tolerance for the "unfit to be seen" customer preference exception usurps the legislature's role as policy maker.191

1. Costs of sublimating customer preferences
Disallowing customer preference-based discrimination imposes
some costs on businesses in the form of compliance and lost customers.192 The ADA also imposes the costs of governmental enforcement

187.
188.
189.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2018).
See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
See discussion infra Part II.C.2; see also Craig Westergard, Note, You Catch More
Flies with Honey: Reevaluating the Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII,
20 MARQ. BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 215, 248-49 (2019) (citing sources).
190. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
191. E.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985)
(stating that courts should defer to Congress when the legislature makes policy choices that involve weighing competing goals).
192. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480–94 (1992) (the ADA costs businesses sales and customers when it disallows discrimination based on customer preferences); Peter David Blanck,

The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part I:
Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 898–909 (1997) (discussing the costs imposed by the ADA).
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on all taxpaying entities.193 In the aggregate, however, these costs are
insubstantial. Most rational consumers do not walk away from the lowest price or the highest quality product just because of an irrational
aversion to the employment of disabled persons.194 Instead, their rational desire to maximize utility prevails over any irrational prejudice
against disabled persons.195 In addition, the costs of the ADA's bar
against customer preference-based discrimination will decrease over
time as previously prejudiced customers are exposed to persons with
disabilities and their irrational beliefs begin to fade.196
The costs of accommodation are also slight. Disabled persons can,
with reasonable accommodation, perform essential job functions just
as effectively as other individuals.197 The only real exception to this
truism is when customer preferences for nondisabled employees are
based on concerns for health or safety, which the text of the ADA already addresses.198 The inherent costs of accommodation tend to be
either low or nonexistent.199 In any case, it is the prerogative of the
193. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 10-116, at 90–94 (1989) (discussing costs the ADA would impose on federal, state, and local governments).
194. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 496 (1992)
(consumers are usually rational); Monroe Peter Friedman, Quality and Price Considerations in
Rational Consumer Decision Making, 1 J. CONSUMER AFF. 13, 13 (1967) (rational consumers
tend to account for price and quality).
195. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 520–21 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979). While it may be rational for businesses to give heed
to customer preferences, this only reinforces irrational prejudices. Cass Sunstein, Three Civil
Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 760 (1991) (economically rational discrimination tends to
reinforce prejudice).
196. Jessica Walker & Katrina Scior, Tackling Stigma Associated with Intellectual Disability Among the General Public: A Study of Two Indirect Contact Interventions, 34 RES. IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2200, 2201 (2013) (repeated exposure decreases stigma).
197. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 86 (2000). As such, customer preferences for nondisabled persons are almost
always irrational. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV.
833, 848 (2001) (consumer discrimination on the basis of race or sex is irrational); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1992) (discussing erroneous beliefs and irrationality).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). Such concerns must still be legitimate, of course. A customer's irrational belief that cancer is contagious, or that diabetes precludes occupation as a
teacher or a doctor would not implicate this defense. Compare Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577
F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984), with Abrams v. Baylor Coll.
of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th
Cir. 1986).
199. Blanck, supra note 192, at 903 ("[D]irect costs of the accommodations for any particular disability tend to be low, [and] many companies regularly make informal and undocumented
accommodations that require minor and cost-free workplace adjustments that are implemented
directly by an employee and [a] supervisor."); see also Kuehl v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 F.
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legislature to impose these costs on businesses,200 and to impose utility
costs on customers.201 Congress has found that disability discrimination itself "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."202 The
costs of such dependency and nonproductivity likely outweigh any
costs associated with disability antidiscrimination laws.

2. Benefits of sublimating customer preferences
The benefits that accrue as discrimination decreases and inclusivity
increases are well documented. One of the primary benefits of decreased discrimination against disabled persons is that worker productivity increases.203 Worker morale and motivation improve when inclusivity increases,204 and diversity also helps increase creativity and
innovation in the workplace and results in a more positive public image.205
Accommodating disabled workers can also lead to increased business.206 For example, Representative Amo Houghton of New York told
of a restaurant in his district that, to comply with state law, "was forced
to install an elevator to take disabled patrons to one of the three floors
Supp. 794, 798 (D. Colo. 1995) (store greeter periodically sitting on stool while at work).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (commerce clause). The commerce power is extremely broad
and allows Congress to regulate virtually all aspects of American business and society. See, e.g.,
Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and Morrison: The Case
for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1685–99 (2002). But
see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987).
201. See Kelman, supra note 197, at 848 ("The customer will bear only psychic
losses . . . .").
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2018).
203. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 (1996) (accommodating disabled workers increases worker
productivity); see also Blanck, supra note 192, at 904 (accommodating disabled workers allows
qualified workers to stay in the work force and reduces absenteeism).
204. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance:
A Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715, 723 (2011); Swinton W. Hudson,
Jr., Diversity in the Workforce, 3 J. EDUC. & HUM. DEV. 73, 80 (2014); M.V. Lee Badgett et al.,
The Business Impact of LGBT-Supportive Workplace Policies, WILLIAMS INST. (2013),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Business-Impact-of-LGBT-PoliciesMay-2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
205. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 204; Brooke & Tyler, supra note 204; Karen A. Jehn,

Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A New Form of Organizing in the
Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 473 (1998).
206. See, e.g., Blanck, supra note 192, at 879 n.130 (noting that hiring, working with, and
accommodating disabled persons increases available customer pools, employee morale, profitability, creativity, and flexibility).
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of the restaurant. The proprietor resisted the mandate but finally complied. To his surprise, he found that his business increased because of
his initiative. The move helped attract [disabled persons] to his restaurant."207 Because some accommodations increase accessibility for both
workers and patrons alike, complying with antidiscrimination law may
help businesses to increase their customer bases directly. But accommodating disabled persons also attracts customers indirectly by enhancing employers' images and creating other synergistic benefits.208
When antidiscrimination laws are successful, these benefits succeed in
offsetting many of the costs of compliance.209

3. Fairness of sublimating customer preferences
It is fair to both employers and disabled persons to disallow most
types of customer preference defenses to discrimination. Employers
have been on notice of the ADA's requirements since at least 1990.210
The ADA was easily foreseeable after the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973,211 was phased in gradually,212 and was not fully enforced by the courts until after the ADAAA was passed in 2008.213
While disabilities are not always immutable, the acquisition of a disability usually lacks scienter or fault, and so it is unfair to disabled persons to allow employers to discriminate on the basis of a characteristic
that cannot be changed.214 Disability discrimination contradicts fundamental moral precepts like doing good to all and the Golden Rule.215
Fundamentally, discrimination in employment on the basis of disability is irrational.216 It is based on unfounded fears and prejudices that

207.
208.
209.

136 CONG. REC. 10,875 (1990).
See, e.g., Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 203, at 23.
John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1601–02 (1992).
210. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)).
211. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2018)).
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
213. See Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)); see also supra Part I.A.2
and Part II.B.1.
214. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
1213, 1238–39 (2003).
215. See Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1529 (2009); Hunter v. Ward, 476 F. Supp. 913, 918 & n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
216. See supra Part II.C.I.
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cannot be justified by the discriminatory preferences of an employer's
customers.217 Because the costs of accommodating disabled workers
tend to be low and are often offset by the benefits of increased diversity
and inclusion, and because disability discrimination is fundamentally
unfair, courts should only recognize defenses based on customer preferences in limited circumstances.

D. How Courts Should Treat Customer Preferences under the ADA
Customer preference-based defenses under the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes should receive similar treatment.218 This Note
proposes the following with regard to customer preference defenses
under the ADA: first, that preferences pertaining to safety generally be
considered a defense; second, that preferences pertaining to privacy
not be considered a defense; third, that preferences pertaining to authenticity be considered a defense only within the context of acting and
only when the disability is reasonably apparent and negatively affects
audiences; and fourth, that the "unfit to be seen" strain of the customer
preference defense be expressly repudiated.219
Customer preferences that pertain to health or safety are expressly
recognized by the ADA, and so are permissible.220 Customer preferences that pertain to privacy usually only arise in the context of sex
discrimination, and there is no compelling reason to extend this rationale to disability discrimination.221 Customer preferences that pertain to authenticity generally only arise in the context of acting or in
cultivating a desired atmosphere, as in the case of an authentic Chinese

217. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[S]ociety's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment."); Feder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[Employers] cannot justify otherwise unlawful discrimination on the ground
that one's customers do not like to deal with members of a protected class.").
218. Jones, supra note 171, at 494 (predicting that customer preference under the ADA
would align with the caselaw under Title VII). Similar treatment of ADA and Title VII claims
would be efficient because employers would only need to comply with a single legal standard. It
would also be fair because Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs would not be able to recover windfalls
unavailable to ADA plaintiffs.
219. This proposal is not dramatic. Instead, it essentially recommends that courts comply
with the text of the ADA, the intentions of the enacting legislature, the ADA's underlying policies, and the caselaw surrounding antidiscrimination law generally.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018).
221. See supra Part I.C.2.
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restaurant.222 Historical or artistic accuracy may be a compelling reason to allow customer preference-based defenses within the context of
acting; cultivating an atmosphere that is free of disabled persons is antithetical to the ADA's purpose, however, and so cannot be considered
a compelling justification.223 Customer preferences that are based on
aversion to a disabled person's appearance, smell, voice, and so on are
facially discriminatory, and catering to this kind of animus is likewise
contrary to the ADA.224
This proposal could be further refined with regard to safety- and
authenticity-based defenses. The policies of the ADA are maximized,
first, when customer preferences are real rather than hypothetical; second, when disregarding such preferences would impose significant
hardship on an employer; and third, when employers must meet a
heightened duty of accommodation if they wish to cater to subjective
customer preferences.
Hypothetical customer preferences are not a compelling reason to
accept employers' affirmative defenses and have been consistently rejected by courts.225 Hypothetical preferences can easily be fabricated
by employers that wish to discriminate and can be based on faulty assumptions about customer preferences.226 As such, hypothetical preferences can never result in legitimate undue hardship or true business
necessity.227

222. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp.
1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. See supra Part II.A, Part II.B, and Part II.C.
225. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 586 (6th
Cir. 2018) ("We hold . . . that a [defendant] cannot rely on customers' presumed biases.") (emphasis added); EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 427 n.5 (W.D. Va. 1996) (relying
on deposition testimony which assumed that an employee's disability would negatively affect customers), aff'd 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292,
303 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting defendant's claim as "speculative at best").
226. This is part of the problem with cases like Chico Dairy and Kenny Shoe Corporation,
which are described in in detail in Part I.C.3. In Chico Dairy, the employer assumed without
evidence that vendors would be off put by an employee's prosthetic eye. Chico Dairy Co. v. W.
Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va. 1989). Likewise, in Kenny Shoe Corporation, the employer's concerns that an employee's seizures would negatively affect customers were
largely hypothetical. Martinson v. Kenney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
227. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. at 303 ("[N]or is there competent proof that the customer preference for females is so strong that Defendant's male passengers would cease doing
business with Southwest . . . ."); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1241 (2003) (discussing the
court's insinuation in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1993) that
defendants must demonstrate the imposition of "a real economic cost"). But see Torres v. Wis.
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Customer preference-based defenses must also allege significant
hardship in order to be legally cognizable. In general, prioritizing nondiscrimination against disabled employees at the expense of customer
preferences is a reasonable accommodation.228 Employers may escape
this duty if they can show that accommodation would result in undue
hardship, but this burden must be significant to satisfy the requirements of the ADA.229 While employers are not required to venture to
the verge of bankruptcy to accommodate disabled workers, customer
preferences must result in more than mere unprofitability.230 Employers seeking to justify discriminatory employment decisions on the basis
of customer preferences must therefore prove that sublimating these
preferences would result in significant undue hardship.
Customer preferences that are idiosyncratic or subjective should
be scrutinized even more carefully.231 Employers owe a heightened
duty to accommodate disabled employees when customer biases
against them are irrational and based on fear or prejudice. By following
these recommendations, and limiting defenses based on customer preferences, courts will more fully implement the policies espoused by the
ADA and more effectively protect the rights of disabled workers.

fffK=`çåÅäìëáçå=
The United States has a storied history of discrimination against
persons with disabilities—from the ugly laws of the late-1800s, to judicially-sanctioned forced sterilization during the 1920s, to the "unfit
to be seen" exception tacitly accepted by some modern courts. Congress enacted the ADA to combat such undesirable discrimination.
The ordinary language of the act, its broad remedial purpose, and its
underlying policies each mitigate in favor of disallowing most forms of

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that it was unrealistic and unfair for the district court to require empirical evidence of the benefits of restricting
prison guards to only females), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989).
228. See supra Part II.A.2.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2018); see also Weber, supra note 157, at 1150–51.
230. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[C]ustomer preference may be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to
perform the primary function or service it offers.") (emphasis added); Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. at 303 (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)) (raising
customer preferences as a defense requires "business necessity, not business convenience").
231. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1044 (11th Cir. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]ourts have examined and should continue to examine subjective reasons with higher scrutiny than objective reasons.").
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the customer preference defense. Congress and the courts can uphold
the ADA's policies and protect persons with disabilities from discrimination by expressly repudiating the "unfit to be seen" strain of this
defense; they can also further the act's policy goals by adopting heightened standards in evaluating all employer defenses that are based on
untoward customer preferences.

Craig Westergard*
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